Playing the Sycophant Card: The Logic and Consequences of Professing Loyalty to the Autocrat (with A. Baturo and J. Tolstrup, Accepted)

We explain under what conditions autocratic elites “overpraise” the ruler and imitate his rhetoric. We find that elites who are politically vulnerable and without alternative career paths behave more sycophantically, and survive in office longer.

“We Don't Abandon Our Own People”: Public Rhetoric of Russia’s Governors during the Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine (Accepted)

I find that weaker governors from poorer regions cover more support measures for combatants and their families, and humanitarian aid to the annexed territories when discussing the war in Ukraine.

Political Economy of COVID-19 Response in Autocracies: Evidence from Russian Regions (Revise & Resubmit)

The study develops a theory of subnational responses to the global pandemic in autocracies and tests it on original data on anti-COVID measures in Russian regions, demonstrating that political incentives determined the stringency of policy response.

Complexity of Political Speech in Autocracies: When do Authoritarian Elites Adapt Rhetoric to their Audience? (with A. Baturo, Under Review)

Drawing on a dataset of Russian governors’ annual addresses in 2007-2021, we find that authoritarian elites from more developed regions speak simpler and more congruent with their role as politicians.

Crises and Communicative Strategies of Elites: The Case of Russian Deputies during the 2022 Invasion of Ukraine (with D. Romanov and M. Belov, In Progress)

The study applies text-as-data methods to analyze public rhetoric of Russian deputies during the war in Ukraine. We find that elites from the ruling party and with security background communicate about the war more directly than their counterparts.